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The Bank of Canada: Moving
Towards Transparency
John Chant, Special Adviser, 2001–20021
• During the 1990s, the Bank of Canada made
several changes that transformed its conduct
of monetary policy. These changes are part of
an evolution in the Bank’s approach that has
continued since the 1970s.
• During the 1960s and 1970s, policy decisions
were made in an environment characterized
by instrument opaqueness and goal opaque-
ness, which tended to shield the Bank’s
operations from scrutiny and accountability.
• Since the 1970s, the Bank has moved towards
transparency and openness by rejecting
multiple policy instruments and adopting a
single, well-defined goal of inflation control.
• A recent survey shows that the Bank of
Canada is in the middle range of central banks
with regard to its transparency.
• The signiﬁcant developments that have
occurred in central banking and monetary
policy since the 1960s have beneﬁted the
public. However, central banks should not
assume that the costs and beneﬁts are obvious
to everyone, but should continue to support
research on the beneﬁts of low and stable
inﬂation and continually inform other policy-
makers and the public of their results.
1.   John Chant is a professor of Economics at Simon Fraser University and
was Special Adviser at the Bank of Canada from September 2001 to August
2002. This article is based on remarks addressed to the senior ofﬁcers of the
Bank of Canada on 16 July 2002. The views expressed in it are those of the
author. No responsibility for them should be attributed to the Bank of Canada.
ver the past decade, the Bank of Canada
has transformed its conduct of monetary
policy by focusing on an explicit inflation-
control target, establishing a Governing
Council for decision-making, announcing a target
overnight interest rate, and adopting ﬁxed action
dates for making policy changes.2 These changes are
part of a continuing evolution in the Bank’s approach
that has taken place since the 1970s.
The 1960s and Early 1970s:
Opaqueness
The Bank of Canada operated much
differently in the late 1960s than it
does today.
The Bank of Canada operated much differently in the
late 1960s than it does today.3 A most notable difference
was the apparent efforts made by the Bank in earlier
years to shield its operations from scrutiny. It did this
through a combination of instrument and goal
opaqueness, as part of a policy approach characterized
bygeneral, andmostly unnecessary,secrecy. 4Acheson
2. Jenkins (2001) describes the Bank’s measures to improve transparency and
accountability as well as its approaches to communication.
3.  This section is based on papers written by the author with Keith Acheson
in the early 1970s.
4.   Goodfriend (1986, 90) concludes his critique of the arguments for central
bank secrecy as follows: “Given the inconclusiveness of the theoretical argu-
ments and the presumption that government secrecy is inconsistent with the
healthy functioning of a democracy, further work is required to demonstrate
that central bank secrecy is socially beneﬁcial.”
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and Chant (1973) used the theory of bureaucracy to
interpret this approach as a device to avoid scrutiny
and accountability. Max Weber, who originated the
theory, argued that the administration of bureaus (that
is, agencies and departments within government)
“always tends to be an administration of ‘secret ses-
sions’: in so far as it can, it hides its knowledge and
actions from criticism” (Gerth and Mills 1946, 233).5
Instrument opaqueness refers to a manner of conducting
policy that makes it difﬁcult for outsiders to observe
and understand the Bank’s policy actions. At the Bank
of Canada, this was achieved by using multiple policy
instruments, with an emphasis on instruments that
are opaque, such as moral suasion. In addition, the
Bank offered little guidance as to the signiﬁcance that
it attached to each of these instruments and the pur-
poses to which they were directed.6
The use of multiple policy instruments makes it difﬁ-
cult for observers to form an overall view of the thrust
of policy because different instruments can be used for
different purposes at any time. In the 1960s, the Bank
used variations of the secondary-reserve ratio, transfer
of government deposits,7 open market operations,
and changes in the bank rate as active policy instru-
ments. In addition, from 1954 to 1967 the Bank had,
but never used, the power to change (within limits)
the statutory cash-reserve requirement. This reliance
on multiple instruments contrasted with the economic
wisdom of the day on the conditions required for
effective monetary control. The late Harry Johnson, a
prominent Canadian economist, observed (1968, 977–
78), “In the actual practice of central banking, how-
ever, reliance is placed on additional instruments and
techniques of control over the commercial banks.
From the point of view of the theory of monetary con-
trol, these additional controls are unnecessary.”
In addition to using many instruments, the Bank
favoured those that were opaque. Opaque instruments
do not leave clear tracks, making it difficult for observers
to document their use, and even more difﬁcult to
assess their effects.The Bank’s use of moral suasion,
rather than more direct policy action, to ensure the
compliance of ﬁnancial agents during this period
5.   Other key contributors to the literature on bureaucracy include Downs
(1967), Niskanen (1971), Selznick (1948), and Tullock (1965).
6.   In contrast, the Bank now makes it clear that the target overnight interest
rate is its key instrument.
7.    See the Glossary for an explanation of these instruments.
illustrates the point. Table 1 shows that the Bank of
Canada had agreements with chartered banks in 12 of
the 23 years between 1946 and 1969, indicating that,
during this time, the Bank made considerable use of
moral suasion. Yet the Bank’s own reference to how it
used moral suasion indicates how difﬁcult it would
have been to track either its use or its effects. Accord-
ing to the Bank (1962, 37), moral suasion consists of a
“wide range of possible initiatives by the central bank
designed to enlist the co-operation of commercial
banks or of other ﬁnancial institutions in pursuit of
some objective of financial policy.” Such actions (1962,
38) range from “general exchanges of views” to “efforts
by the central bank to achieve, through suggestion,
discussion and persuasion, specific changes . . . in poli-
cies or practices of private ﬁnancial organizations.”
Even though secrecy does not contribute to the effec-
tiveness of moral suasion, Governor Rasminsky, testi-
fying in 1963 before the Royal Commission on
Banking and Finance (BoC 1964, 54), was reluctant to
reveal details of how it was employed by the Bank:
1946 Limit on government security holdings of chartered banks to 90% of
Canadian personal savings deposits
1948 Limit on term loans
1951 Limit on total loans
Limit on term loans
1955 Limit on term loans in amount exceeding $250,000
Minimum liquid-asset ratio
1956 Limit on lending to consumer finance companies
Special consideration to small borrowers
1957 Encouragement to mortgage loans
Restrictions on term lending
1958 Term loan agreement revised to $2,000,000 ceiling
1959 Term loan agreement revised to $1,000,000 ceiling
1965 Accommodation to finance companies
Request to discourage U.S. subsidiaries from switching to Canadian
sources of funds because of U.S. balance-of-payment guidelines
1967 Agreement on maximum interest on term deposits
Request to refrain from extending credit for the purchase of gold
1968 Request to discourage use of bank credit to make abnormal transfers of
funds or to replace funds normally obtained from parent companies by
U.S. subsidiaries
Request to restrict the outflow of funds through certain currency deposit
transactions
1969 Ceiling on “swap” deposits accepted by chartered banks
Special regard for borrowers in less prosperous areas of the country
Special attention to loan applications from small businesses without
alternative sources of credit
Table 1
Examples of the Use of Moral Suasion: 1946-69
Year Purpose
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Commissioner Brown: “Have you had any experience
with the use of moral suasion?”
Governor Rasminsky: “Yes.”
CB: “Has it been . . . .?”
GR: “I have been satisﬁed with the results, yes.”
CB: “I gather that you prefer not to . . ..”
GR: “I think that the experience is so recent—I mean,
it is obviously an experience within the last eighteen
months, Mr. Brown, and if you don’t mind I would
prefer not to discuss the details.”
The Bank practised goal opaqueness
by pursuing multiple goals without
making clear statements about its
priorities regarding those goals.
Goal opaqueness refers to a central bank’s failure to
identify its speciﬁc goals in order to provide a basis
for evaluating its performance.The Bank practised
goal opaqueness by pursuing multiple goals without
making clear statements about its priorities regarding
those goals.8 Table 1 shows that the varied purposes of
moral suasion, which included encouraging mortgage
ﬁnancing for housing, as well as support for small
business and regional development, went far beyond
the recognized concerns and capacities of monetary
policy.
Finally, the overall degree of secrecy adopted by the
Bank exceeded whatever level might be considered
necessary for conducting monetary policy effectively.
Both the Bank and the Minister of Finance, for exam-
ple, refused to disclose details of the arrangements
through which certain investment dealers, known as
jobbers, qualiﬁed for special lines of credit on favour-
able terms.9 The Bank would not disclose the names of
the jobbers, the size of the lines of credit, the terms for
qualifying as a jobber, or the criteria for determining
their lines of credit. In reply to a question in Parlia-
ment, the Minister of Finance declared, “Because of
the banker-client relationship that is involved and
8. James Coyne, the Governor from 1955 to 1961, was adamant, however, in his
claim that monetary policy could do nothing to prevent unemployment in the long
run. In this respect, he led most economists.
9.   See Fullerton (1962) for details of the role and privileges of the jobbers.
because the number changes from time to time the
Bank has not made a practice of publishing the names
of such jobbers.” (Canada 1969, 2067) This approach
left the Bank effectively unaccountable for determin-
ing who would beneﬁt from these special privileges.
Notable progress has been made since the 1970s in
removing these obstacles to the accountability of cen-
tral banks. In both its goals and operations, the Bank
has shifted away from opaqueness towards greater
opennessandtransparency.Interms ofoperations,the
Bank has discarded many of its former policy instru-
ments, including secondary-reserve requirements,
relianceonmoralsuasion,andvariablestatutorycash-
reserve requirements. It has also taken responsibility
for the target overnight rate (and the bank rate, which
is 25 points above it) and has identiﬁed the target
overnight rate as its primary policy instrument. The
Bank also makes it clear that the primary purpose of
other instruments, such as auctions of government
deposits and repo operations, is to ensure that the
level of balances in the Large Value Transfer System is
adequate to achieve the desired interest rate target.
Since the public’s primary concern with the perform-
ance of policy should be its outcome—performance
with respect to goals rather than how they are
attained—an even more signiﬁcant factor has been the
Bank’s increased accountability for a single, well-
deﬁned goal. The movement towards this position
began in the mid-1970s with the adoption of monetary
targets and a clearer focus on long-run price stability
and culminated in the adoption of the inflation-
control target in 1991.
Sources of Greater Openness
What broad trends in society and the economy moti-
vated these changes towards openness and accounta-
bility? At least some of the actions of any instrument
of government such as a central bank will be deter-
mined by its status as a bureau. But a bureau acts sub-
ject to its knowledge and to the constraints created by
its environment, which in turn depend on the public’s
knowledge and preferences. What, then, has changed?
From ﬁxed to ﬂexible exchange rates
The movement away from a ﬁxed exchange rate
removed a substantial obstacle to openness. Simply
put, ﬁxed exchange rates are an enemy of openness.
They give investors one-sided wagers when the cur-
rency faces likely devaluation or revaluation. Inves-
tors bear little risk betting on any changes, since they
reap substantial gains when they occur and face only8 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2003
small losses when they don’t. Central banks cannot be
consistently open under ﬁxed exchange rates. Signs of
weakness could provoke a ﬂurry of self-fulﬁlling, one-
sided wagers among investors. Even disclosure of
strength is not feasible because its absence at other
times would imply weakness.
An interesting example of the degree of secrecy neces-
sitated by ﬁxed exchange rates is provided by the
experience of the head of the Netherlands Bank who,
at his government’s prodding, phoned the Bank of
England on Friday 18 September 1931 and asked
whether the gold value of his bank’s sterling balance
was safe. After receiving assurances that it was, the
Netherlands Bank supported the Bank of England by
not converting its sterling balances to gold. The British
government effectively abandoned the gold standard
the next Monday, plunging the value of the pound
from US$4.87 to US$3.40. The Netherlands Bank lost
its capital, and its head lost his job (Yeager 1976).
Flexible exchange rates differ markedly in their scope
for openness. Under ﬁxed rates, a central bank must
often struggle against the crowd in carrying out pol-
icy. In contrast, under ﬂexible exchange rates a credi-
ble anchor such as an inﬂation target shifts the
balance. Markets can contribute to reaching the target
if things get off course. Openness and transparency in
this case facilitate the achievement of the target.
Experience
Governments and the public came to
understand, through the experiences
of the 1970s and early 1980s, that
inﬂation might not have been the
panacea that many initially thought
it would be.
Governments and the public came to understand,
through the experiences of the 1970s and early 1980s,
that inﬂation might not have been the panacea that
many initially thought it would be. The ﬁrst doses of
inflation in the early seventies may have been euphoric.
For some, this unexpected inﬂation substantially
reduced the real value of their mortgages. But the
euphoria was short-lived. Inﬂation quickly became
identiﬁed with higher-than-normal rates of unem-
ployment, the so-called “stagﬂation.” These experi-
ences stimulated the economics profession to
reconsider its analysis of inﬂation and to reassess its
costs.
Economic knowledge
The evolution of economic knowledge itself has con-
tributed to openness by narrowing the goals of central
banks, providing a clearer framework for assessing
the stance of policy, and lowering expectations of
what can be accomplished.
Several developments have clariﬁed expectations
about the ability of central banks to pursue multiple
goals. Tinbergen’s (1956) recognition of the relation
between targets and instruments showed that multi-
ple goals cannot be achieved through the use of one
instrument. This was followed by the work of Fried-
man (1968) and Phelps (1967, 1968) denying the exist-
ence of any long-term trade-off between inﬂation and
unemployment. These developments together pre-
pared the intellectual groundwork for central banks to
focus on the single target of controlling inﬂation while
choosing a suitably long horizon that would help to
maintain the stability of output as inﬂation returned
to the target following a shock.
Similarly,greaterawarenessofthedistinctionbetween
real and nominal interest rates10 also increased trans-
parency. In the 1960s and 1970s, announcements by
the Bank of Canada of its policy stance had frequently
been unclear and ambiguous. Rising interest rates
combined with rapid monetary growth could be char-
acterized as tightness by referring to interest rates, or
as ease by referring to monetary growth. Such different
interpretations were possible because of the general
failure to distinguish between real and nominal inter-
est rates.
The difference between real and nominal interest rates
has a long history in economics, dating most notably
to the work of Irving Fisher (1930). Nevertheless, it
was the experience of the 1970s, when the need to take
account of inﬂationary expectations in interpreting
10.   Nominal and real interest rates differ by a component that covers
expected inﬂation. Nominal interest rates reﬂect the monetary returns
received by bond-holders. In times of inﬂation, part of this return is eroded by
the decreased purchasing power of the bond. Real interest rates equal nomi-
nal interest rates less this inﬂation premium and indicate the actual purchas-
ing power gained from holding the bond. For example, with a nominal
interest rate of 6 per cent and an expected rate of inﬂation of 2 per cent, the
bond’s value in terms of purchasing power decreases by 2 per cent and the
expected real rate of interest is 4 per cent.9 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2003
interest rates became evident, that made the bulk of
the economics profession aware of the distinction.
This awareness also contributes to greater accounta-
bility.
Finally, there was greater appreciation among econo-
mists that efforts to direct credit to speciﬁc uses were
both ineffective and inefﬁcient. The earmarking of
credit for a purpose cannot ensure that credit will be
used for that purpose. There need not be any corre-
spondence between the instruments through which
funds are raised and the uses to which these funds are
put. Cheap mortgage credit can certainly lead to more
borrowing, but homeowners may use the funds to
spend more on cars or holidays. In addition, greater
skepticism developed concerning the ability of gov-
ernments to intervene to provide better allocation of
credit than was achieved in the market.
Greater openness in government
The increasing transparency of the Bank of Canada
has also coincided with a worldwide trend towards
openness and accountability within government.
Governments themselves have seen the advantage of
being more open, and the public has demanded it. In
Canada, this openness has been reﬂected in regular
reviews of key policies by parliamentary committees
andthepassageoffreedom-of-informationlegislation.
Such legislation leaves central banks and other gov-
ernment departments and agencies with an interest-
ing choice: release information at a time and in the
form it chooses, or wait to present it in response to a
formal request.
What More Can Be Done?
Since the 1970s, the Bank of Canada, along with other
central banks, has come a long way towards increased
openness. Nevertheless, a recent survey of central
banks by Eijfﬁnger and Geraats (2002) suggests that
the Bank of Canada ranks in the middle of the pack in
terms of transparency, losing points for neither pub-
lishing the forecasts that shape its policy nor releasing
the minutes and voting records of its governing
body.11
Eijfﬁnger and Geraats observe that all central banks
make numerous forecasts for inﬂation, output, or both
available in some form. The Governing Council of the
11.   In a recent paper, Winkler (2000) suggests that the issue of transparency
in central banks is sufficiently complex that it may not be adequately captured
by these types of measures.
Bank of Canada already provides much information
in its Monetary Policy Report and Updates, which con-
tain (i) a narrative description of the projected path of
inﬂation, including when inﬂation is expected to
return to the 2 per cent target, (ii) a projection of real
GDP growth for the ﬁrst and second halves of the cur-
rent and the next year, (iii) a narrative description of
the future path of the output gap, and, recently, (iv) a
broad indication of the general direction of the target
overnight rate. The Council decides on the content of
these narrative descriptions and projections on the
basis of technical forecasts prepared by the Bank’s
staff and other information.
There is a strong case for the
publication of the staff forecasts used
by the Governing Council in order to
foster better understanding of policy
and to enhance accountability.
There is a strong case for the publication of the staff
forecasts used by the Governing Council in order to
foster better understanding of policy and to enhance
accountability. Such publication would help observers
to form their own views and enable them to better
anticipate Bank policies. While the extent and nature
of the information in these forecasts would be beyond
the capacity of many observers and critics, a substan-
tial core of observers can evaluate and understand it.
Publication would itself be educational and would
raise the general level of sophistication with respect to
monetary policy. People would be able to pick and
choose according to their interests and abilities, as
they do now with the Monetary Policy Report.
These staff forecasts would be most useful if the Bank
published them in the form in which they are sup-
plied to the Governing Council. The alternative—the
Governing Council publishing forecasts in its own
name—would require the Council to shape the staff
forecasts to accord with its own view of the economy.
It is important for accountability, however, that the
public understand the inputs that the Council receives
for its decisions: publication allows the public to judge
both the quality of the inputs and the quality of Coun-
cil’s use of them.10 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2003
An argument against publishing staff forecasts is that
staff might try either to meet the Council’s preferences
or to seek safety by conforming to consensus forecasts.
Regardless of the validity of these somewhat contra-
dictory concerns, publication of the forecasts should
be accompanied by periodic review of forecasting per-
formance conducted by outsiders, with the results
made public. In light of these reviews, the Bank would
have to assess the value added from the resources it
devotes to its own independent forecasting. The abil-
ity of the Bank to conduct its own alternative macro-
economic risk analysis should be an important part of
the assessment.
The case for publishing the minutes and the voting
records of the Governing Council is not strong. While,
arguably, release of minutes might increase under-
standing of policy, review of the minutes published by
other central banks leaves questions about their use-
fulness, especially if forecasts are also published.
The publication of voting records
presents potential difﬁculties that
more than offset any beneﬁts to be
gained from increased transparency.
The publication of voting records presents potential
difﬁculties that more than offset any beneﬁts to be
gained from increased transparency.12 Publication
wouldclearlyincreasetheindividualaccountabilityof
members of the Governing Council. But this change
would require the Governing Council to alter its con-
sensus approach to decision-making. The change
would extend beyond voting to the way in which the
consensus view about the future evolution of policy,
as captured in the Monetary Policy Report and Updates,
would be expressed. Such steps towards increasing
12.   Alan Blinder (1997) argues that central bankers should disclose their
votes in the same way as jurists. The parallel is not exact. Judges are
appointed for life. In addition, their views need to be identiﬁed, since the rea-
soning of legal judgments may be crucial in determining precedents. It mat-
ters whether justices ﬁnd defendants not guilty because the law did not apply,
or because the law did apply and there is insufﬁcient evidence to convict. One
may create a precedent, whereas the other may not.
individual accountability might also create pressures
for change in the process for appointing members of
the Governing Council. This poses the danger of sub-
stituting away from knowledge and expertise in
selecting monetary policy decision-makers and in the
conduct of monetary policy
Any increase in accountability must be balanced
against the problems raised by the disclosure of min-
utes and voting records in a federal state. Clearly, the
Bank must be continually informed of regional condi-
tions in setting its policies. But past regional concerns
have gone further: there have been pressures to use
monetary policy for regional purposes. In these cir-
cumstances, the disclosure of minutes and voting
records could pose signiﬁcant dangers by creating
identiﬁable regional pressures on monetary policy.13
Review of the practices of other central banks in
industrialized countries shows an interesting compar-
ison between federal and unitary states with respect to
their disclosure of voting records. Table 2 shows that
the Federal Reserve alone among central banks in fed-
eral states discloses voting records, while four other
central banks do not. In contrast, all four central banks
in unitary states disclose voting records in some form.
13. The suggestion that monetary policy should be directed towards regional
interests appeared in policy discussions in the early 1970s, at the time of the
ﬁrst Quebec referendum in May 1980, and during the Meech Lake talks of the
early 1990s. See Acheson and Chant (1971) for a discussion of the infeasibility
of regional monetary policy.
1. Eijfﬁnger and Geraats classify the Riksbank as not providing voting records. Board
minutes, however, identify members with reservations about the Riksbank’s decisions
and state that all other members present agreed with the decision.
Source: Eijfﬁnger and Geraats (2002) and Sveriges Riksbank
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Central Banking: The End of History?
Francis Fukuyama used the term “the end of history”
to refer to the possibility that political systems had
evolved to the point where one successful system
dominated and displaced others. Despite the substan-
tial progress with respect to accountability and trans-
parency over the past 30 years, this condition has not
been achieved in central banking. While central bank-
ing may have advanced from an art to the status of a
respectable practice, it still remains short of being a
science. Controversy still swirls around the question
of whether the inﬂation-control objective is too nar-
row. Does it apply beyond rising prices for goods and
services to rising prices for corporate stocks or hous-
ing? As well, the question remains whether the
progress with respect to accountability and transpar-
ency will be permanent. The answer depends on the
degree to which the changes have been based on inno-
vations in knowledge and understanding rather than
on developments in the broad political and economic
environment in which central banks operate.
Understanding must go well beyond
recognizing increases in the quantity
of money as the proximate cause of
inﬂation to the political and economic
forces that ultimately govern money
growth.
The distinction can be illustrated by referring to recent
trends in inﬂation. The quantity theory linking inﬂa-
tion to excess monetary growth is one of the longest-
standing results in economics. It leaves unanswered
why we have had episodes of rapid and slow mone-
tary growth through the ﬁat money era. Understand-
ing must go well beyond recognizing increases in the
quantity of money as the proximate cause of inﬂation
to the political and economic forces that ultimately
govern money growth.
Changes based on better understanding are most
likely to be enduring, while those following develop-
ments in the political and economic environment may
be less durable. Even the latter will differ in durability,
according to their sources. Developments in account-
ability and transparency that reﬂect greater openness
in government may tend to be more permanent than
those that do not.14 The commitment to simple operat-
ing targets focused on observable variables such as the
overnight rate will likely evolve, but in a knowledge-
driven way.
The least-enduring aspect of the Bank’s policy may be
its inability to maintain its primary commitment to a
goal of low and stable inﬂation in the face of possible
dilution of both public and government support for
this objective. Present economic conditions eerily
resemble those of the early 1970s. Equity markets have
been weak, showing no gains over several years; there
is continuing international conﬂict; and governments
have identiﬁed many priorities for additional spend-
ing. At the same time, the public may no longer fully
appreciate the costs of inflation. It is now 11 years since
we have had annual average inflation above
3 per cent, and 19 years since annual average inﬂation
has been above 6 per cent. The 50 per cent of the
labour force under the age of 39 have not experienced
annual average inﬂation of 10 per cent over their
working lives.
Much of the progress in central banking took place in
a period when governments were generally reducing
their direct interventions in markets. A possible out-
come of many aspects of the current turmoil may be
greatergovernmentinvolvementinmarkets.Acentral
bank objective must have the government’s backing to
be credible. But if investment and growth are feeble,
governments may be increasingly tempted to pressure
central bankers to abandon their commitment to price
stability in an effort to bolster longer-term economic
performance.15 Experience suggests that the outcome
would be higher inﬂation without any beneﬁt of
stronger growth.
In the face of these threats, what can central banks do?
In fact, central banks do not have many tools to coun-
ter them. They certainly should not treat the beneﬁts
14. Nevertheless, Alan Greenspan recently stated, “Since I have become a central
banker, I have learned to mumble with great coherence.” See Walsh (2001, 1).
15.   In July 2002, New Zealand’s Finance Minister announced his desire to
rewrite the Reserve Bank’s 0 to 3 per cent contractual target to “adopt a more
ﬂexible approach to inﬂation,” to echo the Australian example. The Reserve
Bank of Australia had adopted a medium-term objective of 2 to 3 per cent
based on the two declared goals in the Reserve Bank Act (1959): stability of
the currency and maintenance of full employment. As a result, New Zealand
authorities revised the Policy Targets Agreement of 17 September 2002 to
raise the ﬂoor of the target range from 0 to 1 per cent. In addition, it appeared
to downplay price stability by shifting emphasis from a goal of “sustainable
employment” fostered by price stability to one of “full employment,” to
which price stability can contribute. See New Zealand (1999, 2002).12 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2003
of the present state of affairs as obvious to others. They
need to continue to support research on the costs and
benefits of low and stable inflation and to continually
inform other policy-makers and the public of their
results. The evolution of central banking and mone-
tary policy has been substantial and to the beneﬁt of
the public. A signiﬁcant likelihood exists that this
progress may be threatened. Central banks must be
committed to ensuring that this progress endures.
Glossary
Fiat money: Money (i.e., bank notes and coins) that is
not backed by gold or silver but is legal tender by gov-
ernment declaration. The intrinsic value of ﬁat money
is divorced from its monetary face value (i.e., the
value stated on it), which rests on public conﬁdence in
the issuing authority—usually the central bank. All
money in circulation in Canada is ﬁat money.
Governing Council: The decision-making body of the
Bank of Canada, consisting of the Governor and Dep-
uty Governors. The Governing Council takes collec-
tive responsibility for the Bank’s affairs, including
formulating and implementing monetary policy.
Liquid-asset ratio: Minimum ratio of liquid assets,
deﬁned as day-to-day loans, Treasury bills, and excess
cash to deposits that banks would maintain on a daily
average basis, based initially on an agreement reached
between the Bank of Canada and chartered banks in
1955 that led, in 1968, to the statutory secondary-
reserve ratio.
Moral suasion: The central bank’s use of its moral
authority to gain voluntary compliance from banks
and other ﬁnancial institutions with respect to
changes in their activities.
Secondary-reserve ratio: Legally based liquid-asset
ratio that in March 1968 replaced the informal liquid-
asset ratio. Changes in the secondary-reserve ratio
were actively used as an instrument of policy until
1976.Thesecondary-reserveratiowaseliminatedwith
the phase-out of the statutory reserve ratio in 1992.
Statutory cash-reserve ratio: A minimum ratio that
banks were required to maintain between their hold-
ings of currency and deposits at the Bank of Canada
and their outstanding deposits. The details changed
over time with respect to the minimum level of
required cash, averaging over reserve period vs. daily
minimum, and the treatment of different types of
deposits. The requirement was phased out beginning
in 1992.
Transfer of government deposits: A technique of
monetary policy through which reserves available to
the banks are altered when the central bank transfers
government deposits between its accounts at the cen-
tral bank and its accounts at the commercial banks.
Source: Shearer, Chant, and Bond (1984), except for the deﬁnition of ﬁat
money, which is adapted from the deﬁnition listed in the Glossary on the
Bank of Canada Web site (www.bankofcanada.ca).13 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2003
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